Sunday, May 20, 2007
How does the directive define a catastrophic emergency? "'Catastrophic Emergency' means any incident, regardless of location, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the U.S. population, infrastructure, environment, economy, or government functions." That's ambiguous enough to encompass many types of events that one could imagine, even one less catastrophic than 9/11, and certainly one that is highly likely to occur some time during the remainder of Bush's term in office. It doesn't necessarily have to be a terrorist incident; it could simply be a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina or Global Warming, or it could be an economic incident like a major recession. In fact, it doesn't even have to occur in the USA -- an incident occurring anywhere on Earth could qualify.
This directive unilaterally grants the President authority to coordinate actions to establish an "Enduring Constitutional Government ... under which the Nation is governed." Considering that each branch of the Federal government is already responsible for its own continuity programs on such occasions, why would America need the President to have ultimate authority for such actions of the legislative and judicial branches? The Constitution only grants him such authority over the executive branch of the government.
The directive proclaims, "The President shall lead the activities of the Federal Government for ensuring constitutional government." Considering Bush's flagrant disregard for the Constitution, this clause fails to provide the American patriot with the sense of security that was intended. On the contrary, it is perhaps the most disquieting clause in the directive. The clause goes on to designate the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as the National Continuity Coordinator "to advise and assist the President in" ensuring constitutional government. After the Department of Homeland Security's response to Hurricane Katrina, and its performance securing our borders, this section of the directive is even more discomforting.
American patriots need to hope against odds that nothing happens before the end of Bush's term in office that he would declare a "catastrophic emergency." If something does, America will be sure to see him effectively crown himself King George. Then who knows when his term will actually end...
The testimony describes Bush's chief of staff Andrew Card and his then chief counsel Alberto Gonzales visiting then attorney general John Ashcroft in the hospital. Ashcroft was critically ill and had accordingly passed the reigns of his position on to Comey pending his recovery. While acting as attorney general, Comey refused to renew one of Bush's classified programs because he and Ashcroft had previously determined that they could not certify its legality. Bush then dispatched Card and Gonzales to Ashcroft's bedside to get him to overrule Comey's decision, even though Ashcroft was still critically ill and seemingly disoriented.
From there, the story gets even more disturbing. It culminates with Bush continuing his classified program in defiance of the DoJ not authorizing it. But rather than relating the story, the testimony speaks most compellingly for itself:
Sen. CHUCK SCHUMER (D-N.Y.): There have been media reports describing a dramatic visit by Alberto Gonzales and Chief of Staff Andrew Card to the hospital bed of John Ashcroft in March 2004, after you, as acting attorney general, decided not to authorize a classified program.
First, can you confirm that a night-time hospital visit took place?
FORMER DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES B. COMEY: Yes, I can.
SCHUMER: OK. Can you remember the date and the day?
COMEY: Yes, sir, very well. It was Wednesday, March the 10th, 2004.
SCHUMER: And how do you remember that date so well?
COMEY: This was a very memorable period in my life; probably the most difficult time in my entire professional life. And that night was probably the most difficult night of my professional life. So it's not something I'd forget.
SCHUMER: Were you present when Alberto Gonzales visited Attorney General Ashcroft's bedside?
SCHUMER: And am I correct that the conduct of Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Card on that evening troubled you greatly?
SCHUMER: OK. Let me go back and take it from the top. You rushed to the hospital that evening. Why?
COMEY: I'm only hesitating because I need to explain why.
SCHUMER: Please. I'll give you all the time you need, sir.
COMEY: I've actually thought quite a bit over the last three years about how I would answer that question if it was ever asked, because I assumed that at some point I would have to testify about it.
The one thing I'm not going to do and be very, very careful about is, because this involved a classified program, I'm not going to get anywhere near classified information. I also am very leery of, and will not, reveal the content of advice I gave as a lawyer, the deliberations I engaged in. I think it's very important for the Department of Justice that someone who held my position not do that.
SCHUMER: In terms of privilege.
COMEY: Yes, sir.
COMEY: Subject to that, I -- and I'm uncomfortable talking about this...
SCHUMER: I understand.
COMEY: ... but I'll answer the question. I -- to understand what happened that night, I, kind of, got to back up about a week.
COMEY: In the early part of 2004, the Department of Justice was engaged -- the Office of Legal Counsel, under my supervision -- in a reevaluation both factually and legally of a particular classified program. And it was a program that was renewed on a regular basis, and required signature by the attorney general certifying to its legality.
And the -- and I remember the precise date. The program had to be renewed by March the 11th, which was a Thursday, of 2004. And we were engaged in a very intensive reevaluation of the matter.
And a week before that March 11th deadline, I had a private meeting with the attorney general for an hour, just the two of us, and I laid out for him what we had learned and what our analysis was in this particular matter.
And at the end of that hour-long private session, he and I agreed on a course of action. And within hours he was stricken and taken very, very ill...
SCHUMER: (inaudible) You thought something was wrong with how it was being operated or administered or overseen.
COMEY: We had -- yes. We had concerns as to our ability to certify its legality, which was our obligation for the program to be renewed.
The attorney general was taken that very afternoon to George Washington Hospital, where he went into intensive care and remained there for over a week. And I became the acting attorney general.
And over the next week -- particularly the following week, on Tuesday -- we communicated to the relevant parties at the White House and elsewhere our decision that as acting attorney general I would not certify the program as to its legality and explained our reasoning in detail, which I will not go into here. Nor am I confirming it's any particular program. That was Tuesday that we communicated that.
The next day was Wednesday, March the 10th, the night of the hospital incident. And I was headed home at about eight o'clock that evening, my security detail was driving me. And I remember exactly where I was -- on Constitution Avenue -- and got a call from Attorney General Ashcroft's chief of staff telling me that he had gotten a call...
SCHUMER: What's his name?
COMEY: David Ayers. That he had gotten a call from Mrs. Ashcroft from the hospital. She had banned all visitors and all phone calls. So I hadn't seen him or talked to him because he was very ill. And Mrs. Ashcroft reported that a call had come through, and that as a result of that call Mr. Card and Mr. Gonzales were on their way to the hospital to see Mr. Ashcroft.
SCHUMER: Do you have any idea who that call was from?
COMEY: I have some recollection that the call was from the president himself, but I don't know that for sure. It came from the White House. And it came through and the call was taken in the hospital.
So I hung up the phone, immediately called my chief of staff, told him to get as many of my people as possible to the hospital immediately. I hung up, called Director Mueller and -- with whom I'd been discussing this particular matter and had been a great help to me over that week -- and told him what was happening. He said, "I'll meet you at the hospital right now."
Told my security detail that I needed to get to George Washington Hospital immediately. They turned on the emergency equipment and drove very quickly to the hospital. I got out of the car and ran up -- literally ran up the stairs with my security detail.
SCHUMER: What was your concern? You were in obviously a huge hurry.
COMEY: I was concerned that, given how ill I knew the attorney general was, that there might be an effort to ask him to overrule me when he was in no condition to do that.
SCHUMER: Right, OK.
COMEY: I was worried about him, frankly. And so I raced to the hospital room, entered. And Mrs. Ashcroft was standing by the hospital bed, Mr. Ashcroft was lying down in the bed, the room was darkened. And I immediately began speaking to him, trying to orient him as to time and place, and try to see if he could focus on what was happening, and it wasn't clear to me that he could. He seemed pretty bad off.
SCHUMER: At that point it was you, Mrs. Ashcroft and the attorney general and maybe medical personnel in the room. No other Justice Department or government officials.
COMEY: Just the three of us at that point. I tried to see if I could help him get oriented. As I said, it wasn't clear that I had succeeded.
I went out in the hallway. Spoke to Director Mueller by phone. He was on his way. I handed the phone to the head of the security detail and Director Mueller instructed the FBI agents present not to allow me to be removed from the room under any circumstances. And I went back in the room.
I was shortly joined by the head of the Office of Legal Counsel assistant attorney general, Jack Goldsmith, and a senior staffer of mine who had worked on this matter, an associate deputy attorney general. So the three of us Justice Department people went in the room. I sat down...
SCHUMER: Just give us the names of the two other people.
COMEY: Jack Goldsmith, who was the assistant attorney general, and Patrick Philbin, who was associate deputy attorney general.
I sat down in an armchair by the head of the attorney general's bed. The two other Justice Department people stood behind me. And Mrs. Ashcroft stood by the bed holding her husband's arm. And we waited.
And it was only a matter of minutes that the door opened and in walked Mr. Gonzales, carrying an envelope, and Mr. Card. They came over and stood by the bed. They greeted the attorney general very briefly. And then Mr. Gonzales began to discuss why they were there -- to seek his approval for a matter, and explained what the matter was -- which I will not do.
And Attorney General Ashcroft then stunned me. He lifted his head off the pillow and in very strong terms expressed his view of the matter, rich in both substance and fact, which stunned me -- drawn from the hour-long meeting we'd had a week earlier -- and in very strong terms expressed himself, and then laid his head back down on the pillow, seemed spent, and said to them, "But that doesn't matter, because I'm not the attorney general."
SCHUMER: But he expressed his reluctance or he would not sign the statement that they -- give the authorization that they had asked, is that right?
COMEY: Yes. And as he laid back down, he said, "But that doesn't matter, because I'm not the attorney general. There is the attorney general," and he pointed to me, and I was just to his left. The two men did not acknowledge me. They turned and walked from the room. And within just a few moments after that, Director Mueller arrived. I told him quickly what had happened. He had a brief -- a memorable brief exchange with the attorney general and then we went outside in the hallway.
SCHUMER: OK. Now, just a few more points on that meeting. First, am I correct that it was Mr. Gonzales who did just about all of the talking, Mr. Card said very little?
COMEY: Yes, sir.
SCHUMER: OK. And they made it clear that there was in this envelope an authorization that they hoped Mr. Ashcroft -- Attorney General Ashcroft would sign.
COMEY: In substance. I don't know exactly the words, but it was clear that's what the envelope was.
SCHUMER: And the attorney general was -- what was his condition? I mean, he had -- as I understand it, he had pancreatitis. He was very, very ill; in critical condition, in fact.
COMEY: He was very ill. I don't know how the doctors graded his condition. This was -- this would have been his sixth day in intensive care. And as I said, I was shocked when I walked in the room and very concerned as I tried to get him to focus.
SCHUMER: Right. OK. Let's continue. What happened after Mr. Gonzales and Card left? Did you have any contact with them in the next little while?
COMEY: While I was talking to Director Mueller, an agent came up to us and said that I had an urgent call in the command center, which was right next door. They had Attorney General Ashcroft in a hallway by himself and there was an empty room next door that was the command center. And he said it was Mr. Card wanting to speak to me.
I took the call. And Mr. Card was very upset and demanded that I come to the White House immediately. I responded that, after the conduct I had just witnessed, I would not meet with him without a witness present.
He replied, "What conduct? We were just there to wish him well."
And I said again, "After what I just witnessed, I will not meet with you without a witness. And I intend that witness to be the solicitor general of the United States."
SCHUMER: That would be Mr. Olson.
COMEY: Yes, sir. Ted Olson.
"Until I can connect with Mr. Olson, I'm not going to meet with you."
He asked whether I was refusing to come to the White House. I said, "No, sir, I'm not. I'll be there. I need to go back to the Department of Justice first."
And then I reached out through the command center for Mr. Olson, who was at a dinner party. And Mr. Olson and the other leadership of the Department of Justice immediately went to the department, where we sat down together in a conference room and talked about what we were going to do.
And about eleven o'clock that night -- this evening had started at about eight o'clock, when I was on my way home. At eleven o'clock that night, Mr. Olson and I went to the White House together.
SCHUMER: Just before you get there, you told Mr. Card that you were very troubled by the conduct from the White House room (ph), and that's why you wanted Mr. Olson to accompany you.
Without giving any of the details -- which we totally respect in terms of substance -- just tell me why. What did you tell him that so upset you? Or if you didn't tell him just tell us.
COMEY: I was very upset. I was angry. I thought I just witnessed an effort to take advantage of a very sick man, who did not have the powers of the attorney general because they had been transferred to me. I thought he had conducted himself, and I said to the attorney general, in a way that demonstrated a strength I had never seen before. But still I thought it was improper. And it was for that reason that I thought there ought to be somebody with me if I'm going to meet with Mr. Card.
SCHUMER: Can you tell us a little bit about the discussion at the Justice Department when all of you convened? I guess it was that night.
COMEY: I don't think it's appropriate for me to go into the substance of it. We discussed what to do. I recall the associate attorney general being there, the solicitor general, the assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, senior staff from the attorney general, senior staff of mine. And we just -- I don't want to reveal the substances of those...
SCHUMER: I don't want you to reveal the substance. They all thought what you did -- what you were doing was the right thing, I presume.
COMEY: I presume. I didn't ask people. But I felt like we were a team, we all understood what was going on, and we were trying to do what was best for the country and the Department of Justice. But it was a very hard night.
SCHUMER: OK. And then did you meet with Mr. Card?
COMEY: I did. I went with Mr. Olson driving -- my security detail drove us to the White House. We went into the West Wing. Mr. Card would not allow Mr. Olson to enter his office. He asked Mr. Olson to please sit outside in his sitting area. I relented and went in to meet with Mr. Card alone. We met, had a discussion, which was much more -- much calmer than the discussion on the telephone.
After -- I don't remember how long, ten or fifteen minutes -- Mr. Gonzales arrived and brought Mr. Olson into the room. And the four of us had a discussion.
SCHUMER: OK. And was Mr. -- were you and Mr. Card still in a state of anger at one another at that meeting, or is it a little calmer, and why?
COMEY: Not that we showed.
COMEY: It was much more civil than our phone conversation, much calmer.
SCHUMER: Why? Why do you think?
COMEY: I don't know. I mean, I had calmed down a little bit. I'd had a chance to talk to the people I respected. Ted Olson I respect enormously.
SCHUMER: Right. OK. Was there any discussion of resignations with Mr. Card?
COMEY: Mr. Card was concerned that he had heard reports that there were to be a large number of resignations at the Department of Justice.
SCHUMER: OK. OK. And the conversations, the issue, whatever it was, was not resolved.
COMEY: Correct. We communicated about it. I communicated again the Department of Justice's view on the matter. And that was it.
SCHUMER: Right. And you stated that the next day, Thursday, was the deadline for reauthorization of the program, is that right?
COMEY: Yes, sir.
SCHUMER: OK. Can you tell us what happened the next day?
COMEY: The program was reauthorized without us and without a signature from the Department of Justice attesting as to its legality. And I prepared a letter of resignation, intending to resign the next day, Friday, March the 12th.
SCHUMER: OK. And that was the day, as I understand it, of the Madrid train bombings.
COMEY: Thursday, March 11th, was the morning of the Madrid train bombings.
SCHUMER: And so, obviously, people were very concerned with all of that.
COMEY: Yes. It was a very busy day in the counterterrorism aspect.
SCHUMER: Yet, even in light of that, you still felt so strongly that you drafted a letter of resignation.
SCHUMER: OK. And why did you decide to resign?
COMEY: I just believed...
SCHUMER: Or to offer your resignation, is a better way to put it?
COMEY: I believed that I couldn't -- I couldn't stay, if the administration was going to engage in conduct that the Department of Justice had said had no legal basis. I just simply couldn't stay.
SCHUMER: Right. OK. Now, let me just ask you this. And this obviously is all troubling. As I understand it, you believed that others were also prepared to resign, not just you, is that correct?
SCHUMER: OK. Was one of those Director Mueller?
COMEY: I believe so. You'd have to ask him, but I believe so.
SCHUMER: You had conversations with him about it.
SCHUMER: OK. How about the associate attorney general, Robert McCallum?
COMEY: I don't know. We didn't discuss it.
SCHUMER: How about your chief of staff?
COMEY: Yes. He was certainly going to go when I went.
SCHUMER: Right. How about Mr. Ashcroft's chief of staff?
COMEY: My understanding was that he would go as well.
SCHUMER: And how...
COMEY: I should say...
COMEY: ... to make sure I'm accurate, I...
SCHUMER: This is your surmise, not...
COMEY: Yes. I ended up agreeing -- Mr. Ashcroft's chief of staff asked me something that meant a great deal to him, and that is that I not resign until Mr. Ashcroft was well enough to resign with me. He was very concerned that Mr. Ashcroft was not well enough to understand fully what was going on. And he begged me to wait until -- this was Thursday that I was making this decision -- to wait til Monday to give him the weekend to get oriented enough so that I wouldn't leave him behind, was his concern.
SCHUMER: And it was his view that Mr. Ashcroft was likely to resign as well?
SCHUMER: So what did you do when you heard that?
COMEY: I agreed to wait. I said that what I would do is -- that Friday would be last day. And Monday morning I would resign.
SCHUMER: OK. Anything else of significance relevant to this line of questioning occur on Thursday the 11th, that you can recall?
COMEY: No, not that I recall.
SCHUMER: Thank you. Now, let's go to the next day, which was March 12. Can you tell us what happened then?
COMEY: I went to the Oval Office -- as I did every morning as acting attorney general -- with Director Mueller to brief the president and the vice president on what was going on on Justice Department's counterterrorism work.
We had the briefing. And as I was leaving, the president asked to speak to me, took me in his study and we had a one-on-one meeting for about fifteen minutes -- again, which I will not go into the substance of. It was a very full exchange. And at the end of that meeting, at my urging, he met with Director Mueller, who was waiting for me downstairs.
He met with Director Mueller again privately, just the two of them. And then after those two sessions, we had his direction to do the right thing, to do what we...
SCHUMER: Had the president's direction to do the right thing?
COMEY: Right. We had the president's direction to do what we believed, what the Justice Department believed was necessary to put this matter on a footing where we could certify to its legality. And so we then set out to do that. And we did that.
SCHUMER: OK. So let me just (inaudible) -- this is an amazing story, has an amazing pattern of fact that you recall.
Sen. ARLEN SPECTER (R-Pa): Mr. Chairman, could you give us some idea when your first round will conclude?
SCHUMER: As soon as I ask a few questions here. Fairly soon.
SCHUMER: Yes. And, Senator Specter, you will get the same amount of time.
SCHUMER: I thought with Mr. Comey's telling what happened...
SPECTER: Just may the record show that you're now 16 minutes and 35 seconds over the five minutes and...
SCHUMER: I think the record will show it.
SPECTER: Well, it does now.
SCHUMER: OK, thank you. And I think most people would think that those 16:35 minutes were worth hearing.
SPECTER: Well, Mr. Chairman, we do have such a thing as a second round, and there are a lot of senators waiting...
SCHUMER: Yes, OK. Let me ask you these few questions...
SPECTER: ... including a Republican.
SCHUMER: I'm glad you're here, Senator Specter. I know you're concerned with the issue.
SPECTER: Lonely, but here.
SCHUMER: Let me ask you this: So in sum, it was your belief that Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Card were trying to take advantage of an ill and maybe disoriented man to try and get him to do something that many, at least in the Justice Department, thought was against the law? Was that a correct summation?
COMEY: I was concerned that this was an effort to do an end-run around the acting attorney general and to get a very sick man to approve something that the Department of Justice had already concluded -- the department as a whole -- was unable to be certified as to its legality. And that was my concern.
SCHUMER: OK. And you also believe -- and you had later conversations with Attorney General Ashcroft when he recuperated, and he backed your view?
COMEY: Yes, sir.
SCHUMER: Did you ever ask him explicitly if he would have resigned had it come to that?
SCHUMER: OK. But he backed your view over that what was being done, or what was attempting to being done, going around what you had recommended, was wrong, against the law?
COMEY: Yes. And I already knew his view from the hour we had spent together going over it in great detail a week before the hospital incident.
SCHUMER: Yes. And the FBI director, Mueller, backed your view over that of Mr. Gonzales as well -- is that right? -- in terms of whether the program could continue to be implemented the way Counsel Gonzales wanted it to be.
COMEY: The only reason I hesitate is it was never Director Mueller's job or position to be drawing a legal conclusion about the program; that he was very supportive to me personally. He's one of the finest people I've ever met and was a great help to me when I felt a tremendous amount of pressure and felt a bit alone at the Department of Justice. But it was not his role to opine on the legality.
SCHUMER: How about Jack Goldsmith, the head of the Office of Legal Counsel? Did he opine on the legality?
COMEY: Yes. He had done a substantial amount of work on that issue. And it was largely OLC, the Office of Legal Counsel's work, that I was relying upon in drawing my -- in making my decision.
SCHUMER: OK. Just two other questions. Have you ever had the opportunity to recall these events on the record in any other forum?
SCHUMER: OK. And...
COMEY: I should...
SCHUMER: Go ahead.
COMEY: I was interviewed by the FBI and discussed these events in connection with a leak investigation the FBI was conducting.
SCHUMER: And you gave them these details then.
SCHUMER: Thank you.
COMEY: But not -- by forum I've never testified about it.
SCHUMER: And after you stood your ground in March of 2004, did you suffer any recriminations or other problems at the department?
COMEY: I didn't. Not that I'm aware of.
Sunday, May 13, 2007
Each year, the U.S. Department of State releases a report on the incidence of global terrorism. Under Bush's leadership, the news was consistently so bad that his administration even changed the name of the report. Condi recently released the latest report, now called the Country Reports on Terrorism 2006.
This awkwardly named report has some awkward statistics for those who think we're defeating terrorism in Iraq. After substantial increases in global terrorism year after year since the war there began, it turns out that there were again 25 percent more terrorist attacks in 2006 than in 2005. Those attacks killed 20,494 people -- a forty percent increase over 2005. Ironically, fifty percent of those killed by Islamic terrorists were other Muslims, with more than 1,800 of them children.
So how accurate are these statistics? It should come as no surprise if it turns out they're understated. After all, this is the same administration that claims sectarian violence is down in Baghdad since the 'surge.' However, it turns out that U.S. officials exclude car bombs in touting this drop in Iraq violence. The number of people killed in explosive attacks is actually up from 323 in March, the first full month of the security plan, to 365 through April 24.
Faced with these facts, Bush would certainly pull out his old line that 'we're fighting the terrorists in Iraq so we don't have to fight them here.' This is a fallacy easily dispelled. Just last week, six men described by federal prosecutors as "Islamic militants" were arrested on charges they plotted to attack the Fort Dix Army base and "kill as many soldiers as possible," authorities reported. Let's be clear, Fort Dix is not a base in Iraq, it's in New Jersey. None of the six Islamic militants are from Iraq, and they had been in the U.S. for some time.
No, the war in Iraq is not making us safer from terrorism. With global terrorism at an all-time high, it's leading to much greater danger of us suffering more terrorist attacks here in our homeland.
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
The headline reads, "Bush Vetoes Troop Withdrawal Bill," but what he really did was veto a troop funding bill. Bush asked for $124-billion to fund his surge in Iraq. Frankly, congress should not have given Bush a penny for this war because their constituents have made it clear that they don't want the war. Nonetheless, to avoid being branded as not supporting the troops, congress gave Bush his $124-billion appropriation.
Granted, the bill also included a condition that American troop withdrawals begin as early as July 1 and no later than October 1, with the non-binding goal of removing all combat troops by March 31. As well it should -- as stated above, this is what the American people demand of Bush. However, that wasn't the primary purpose of the legislation. It's primary purpose was to support the troops their commander in chief ordered to surge into Iraq. Let's get the story straight, AP.